The Supreme Court of Canada Recognizes the Tort of Intimate Partner Violence

On May 15, 2026, the Supreme Court of Canada issued one of the most consequential family law decisions in a generation. In Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, 2026 SCC 16, a six-to-three majority of the Court recognized a new common law tort of intimate partner violence, anchored in the concept of coercive and controlling conduct. This decision reshapes the legal landscape for survivors of domestic abuse who seek civil remedies, and it signals a profound evolution in how Canadian courts understand and redress intimate partner violence.

Background Facts

Kuldeep Ahluwalia and Amrit Ahluwalia were married in India in 1999 and immigrated to Canada in 2001. They had two children, and the couple separated in 2016. Over the course of the sixteen-year marriage, Ms. Ahluwalia endured what the courts found to be a sustained pattern of serious harm. The plaintiff wife alleged that her former spouse engaged in a prolonged pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour, including intimidation, humiliation, financial restriction, threats, isolation, and violence.

Following separation, Mr. Ahluwalia started divorce proceedings. Ms. Ahluwalia agreed to the divorce and asked for sole decision-making authority for the children, child support, spousal support, equalization of family property, and the sale of the matrimonial home. She also asked for damages for the abuse she suffered.

The Journey Through the Courts

Ontario Superior Court of Justice (2022)

In 2022, Justice Renu Mandhane of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice found that Amrit had engaged in serious physical assault of Ahluwalia on multiple occasions in their marriage, and that there was an overall pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour on his part. The judge recognized a new tort of family violence and awarded Ms. Ahluwalia compensatory, aggravated and punitive damages. Importantly, the judge indicated that even if she had not recognized this new tort, she would have awarded the same amount under the existing torts of assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The total damages awarded at trial amounted to $150,000.

Ontario Court of Appeal (2023)

On appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal disagreed with the creation of the new tort of intimate family violence, ruling that existing torts were adequate to cover the harms suffered by Ms. Ahluwalia. The Court of Appeal reduced the damages award to $100,000. Ms. Ahluwalia then appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Supreme Court of Canada (2026)

The Supreme Court heard the appeal over two days, February 11 and 12, 2025, with seventeen interveners participating, including the Attorney General of Canada, the Attorney General of British Columbia, and numerous family violence support agencies. The Supreme Court gave its decision on May 15, 2026. By a 6-3 decision, the Court allowed the appeal and held that there was a tort of intimate partner violence.

The Three-Part Test for the New Tort

Writing for a five-member majority, Justice Kasirer held that the new tort of intimate partner violence requires a plaintiff to establish three elements: first, that abusive conduct arose within an intimate partner relationship or its aftermath; second, that the defendant intentionally engaged in the abusive conduct; and third, that the conduct, assessed objectively, constituted “coercive control.”

Once the three elements of the tort are established, the harm is necessarily present and liability follows. The majority noted that the quantum of damages must represent a meaningful response to the seriousness of the breach.

It is important to appreciate why the majority found this new tort to be necessary. Prior to Ahluwalia, Canadian tort law provided only limited civil remedies for victims and survivors of domestic violence, including claims for battery, assault, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. The majority explained that the new tort fills a gap in the common law by properly recognizing that conduct objectively resulting in domination and control of an intimate partner is a qualitatively distinct wrong from those wrongs redressable through existing torts. It is the intimate partnership context that enables the abuser to exert control over their victim. Liability arises because coercive control constitutes an interference with an intimate partner’s autonomy; it is inherently incompatible with an intimate partnership as it renders the partnership unequal and results in dignitary harm, alongside, but distinct from, the physical or psychological harm that can be caused by abuse.

The majority also laid down a broader “consolidated framework” governing when courts will recognize any new tort in Canada going forward. This three-part framework requires: first, that the facts of the case disclose a wrongful act that offends a recognized legal interest in private law, or an interest around which there is emerging legal acceptance; second, that existing torts and their associated remedies be incapable of adequately capturing the nature and scope of the wrong; and third, if the first two requirements are satisfied, that the court carefully and narrowly formulate the new tort so that it fills the identified gap while also respecting the judiciary’s limited role in incrementally developing the common law.

The Majority Opinion

Writing for himself and four colleagues (Chief Justice Wagner and Justices Martin, O’Bonsawin, and Moreau), Justice Kasirer allowed the appeal in part. The majority held that Ms. Ahluwalia had established the three elements of the new tort, and that Mr. Ahluwalia’s conduct controlled her and undermined her dignity, autonomy, and equality in the relationship. The harm she suffered therefore fell within the scope of the new tort of intimate partner violence.

The majority’s reasons reflect a recognition that domestic abuse is not merely a collection of isolated incidents, but rather a pattern of domination that cannot be fully captured by traditional torts. The Court’s decision paves the way for litigants to pursue damages against their romantic partners for a range of conduct beyond physical violence, including isolation, humiliation, surveillance, financial control, sexual coercion, and intimidation.

Justice Karakatsanis provided a concurring opinion, agreeing with the recognition of the new tort but going further: she was of the view that the tort of intimate partner violence should not be limited to cases where “coercive control” is established, suggesting the threshold should be framed more broadly to capture the full spectrum of intimate partner violence.

The Dissenting Opinion

Justices Jamal, Côté, and Rowe dissented vigorously. In a dissenting opinion, they would have dismissed the appeal, finding that no new tort was warranted because the plaintiff was fully compensated under existing torts.

Writing for the dissent, Justice Jamal took aim at both the necessity and the workability of the new tort. The dissent reasoned that courts have already relied on existing torts to address the varied and serious harms arising from intimate partner violence, including through increasingly significant damages awards. The dissent also raised broader concerns for litigants and trial courts, questioning whether the new tort provides sufficiently clear guidance regarding what conduct constitutes coercive control, how damages should be assessed, and how the new framework differs in practice from existing tort remedies.

Justice Jamal wrote that the principle that courts should recognize a new tort only when it is necessary to provide a remedy on the facts before them was sufficient to dismiss the appeal, noting that the trial judge had already concluded that Ms. Ahluwalia was owed full compensation under the existing torts. The dissent raised concerns that the new tort introduces uncertainty and risks complicating access to justice.

Significance and Implications

This decision is a watershed moment in Canadian private law. For survivors of intimate partner violence, it provides a dedicated cause of action that captures the holistic, cumulative nature of coercive and controlling conduct, something that a patchwork of existing torts was poorly suited to do. It also sends a clear message from the nation’s highest court about the seriousness with which it views the systemic harm caused by intimate partner violence.

That said, the dissent raises legitimate questions that will need to be worked out in future litigation: Where exactly is the line between actionable coercive control and difficult interpersonal conflict? How will courts assess damages? How will the new tort interact with family law proceedings already adjudicating spousal conduct? These are real and complex questions that practitioners and courts will grapple with in the years ahead.

How Our Firm Can Help

The recognition of the tort of intimate partner violence in Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia opens important new avenues for survivors seeking justice and accountability. However, these are nuanced, fact-intensive claims that require careful and compassionate legal analysis. Every case is different, and the strength of a claim under this new tort will depend heavily on the specific circumstances of the relationship and the evidence available.

Our firm will assess family violence tort matters on a case-by-case basis. If you or someone you know may have a claim arising from intimate partner violence, or if you require advice on how this decision may affect ongoing or contemplated proceedings, we encourage you to reach out to Andy Hayher KC to discuss your situation in confidence.

This article is intended for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For advice specific to your circumstances, please contact our office.