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Most parents assume that if their children have always lived primarily with one parent, that arrangement is safe from major disruption. A recent Alberta Court of King’s Bench decision, EK v RO, 2026 ABKB 485 shows that assumption isn’t always true. It’s worth understanding when and why a court will take the significant step of reversing primary care from one parent to the other.


What is a “reversal of parenting”?

A parenting reversal happens when a court moves a child’s primary residence from the parent who has always had them, to the other parent, often the one with less historical parenting time. Courts recognize this is an extraordinary remedy. It disrupts a child’s routine, school, friendships, and sense of stability. So why would a judge ever order it?

The core problem in EK v RO: one parent undermining the other

In EK v RO, the mother had been the children’s primary caregiver for years. But the court found she had, over time, engaged in a consistent pattern of behaviour that undermined the children’s relationship with their father. This included allowing the children to decide whether they’d see him, speaking negatively about him in their presence, exaggerating, or fabricating safety concerns, and refusing to comply with court orders she didn’t personally agree with.

The court didn’t need to use the label “parental alienation” to make its decision. As the Alberta Court of Appeal noted in JE v KE, 2025 ABCA 298, the more important question is simply whether a parent’s conduct undermines the child’s best interests by marginalizing the other parent’s role, regardless of whether that behaviour fits a clinical definition. The trial judge in EK v RO drew on the list of alienating behaviours identified in PC v WH, 2019 ABQB 616, including refusing to acknowledge anything positive about the other parent, distorting children’s comments to justify accusations, and portraying the other parent as dangerous without evidence.

Why “the child doesn’t want to go” isn’t a defence

A recurring theme in the background history of EK v RO was the mother telling the court, repeatedly, that the children simply refused to see their father. Several judges along the way rejected this justification. As one judge put it, children “don’t get to run this show.” A parenting order is not something children get to veto, and a parent cannot treat a child’s stated preference as an excuse for non-compliance.

This principle has real teeth. In McCarthy v Murray, 2002 ONSC 855, cited approvingly in the Alberta case of TC v MH, 2024 ABKB 447, the court explained that a parent has a positive obligation to require a child to attend access visits, not simply to make the child “available” and leave the decision up to them. Courts ask concrete questions. Did the parent explain why compliance matters? Did they offer incentives? Did they impose consequences for refusal? Simply pointing to the child’s wishes is treated as a failure to parent appropriately and can amount to contempt of court.

Family violence allegations must be proven, not just asserted

EK v RO is also a caution about the weight courts give to alleged family violence. Under sections 16(3)(j) and 16(4) of the Divorce Act, family violence is a critical factor in any parenting decision. But allegations aren’t self-proving. The court in this case accepted that one isolated incident of family violence had occurred years earlier, but rejected the broader narrative that the father posed an ongoing, “prolific” threat, finding much of it unproven or fabricated, and noting the suspicious pattern of allegations resurfacing whenever the father sought to enforce his parenting time.

When is reversal justified?

The court in EK v RO was explicit that reversing parenting is a last resort, warranted only when necessary to protect a child’s long term best interests, even accepting that it will cause real short-term pain, anxiety, and grief. The touchstone remains the best interests’ factors in section 16 of the Divorce Act, including the child’s need for stability, meaningful relationships with both parents, and freedom from a parent’s efforts to control or diminish the other’s role.

The court also drew on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Barendregt v Grebliunas, for the proposition that while children generally benefit from maintaining significant contact with both parents, that principle can give way where a child’s best interests require it.


The takeaway for parents

Courts do not reverse custody lightly and won’t do so as a punishment. But a documented pattern of undermining the other parent’s role, refusing to comply with court orders, and using unproven safety allegations strategically, particularly timed around the other parent’s enforcement applications, can lead a court to conclude that the child’s best interests require a fundamental change.

EK v RO is a stark reminder that even years of primary caregiving will not protect a parent from losing custody if their conduct is found to be harming the children’s relationship with the other parent. If you are a parent going through a high-conflict separation, the lesson is simple: court orders are not optional, and how you talk about the other parent to your children matters far more than you may think.